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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the pathbreaking work of McKinnon (1973) about the
effects of financial repression in the developing countries, a broad
consensus has emerged (among academie economists) about the
importance of financial deregulation in the developing process of
LDCs. This consensus starts from the observationthatcountrieswhich
have regulated the intermediation processbetweensavings andinvest-
ment have experienced important probIems. First, by regulating
interest rates paid on bank deposits, they have found it difficult to
generate a sufficiently large pool of savings, needed in the develop-
ment process. Second, by transferring the control of the allocation
funds in theinvestmentprocessfrom themarketto the politicalsystem,
they have found out how difficult it is to select the investment projects
in an economically rational way. The political and the bureaucratie
mies which in such aregulated environment takeoverfrom the market
allocation mIes are no guarantee that those investment projects will
be selected which speed up the developmentprocess. Onthe contrary,
ithas become increasingly obvious thatpolitical and bureaucratiemIes
fail to detecttheinvestmentprojectswhichwill stimulate thelong-term
growth and development in these countries.
Whereas the need to liberalize financial markets in the LDCs is
now recognized by a large number of economists, all equally broad
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381consensus exists stressing that complete freedom in the financial mar-
kets and in the banking sectors of the LDCs is not in the interest of
these countries. This view has been based on an analysis of market
failures, which identifies a number of problems associated with free
competition in the financial markets. In fact, this view used to be
fashionable, and was used to rationalize large scale government inter-
vention in the financial markets of the LDCs.
Thus, we are in a situation in which economists recognize the need
to liberalize financial markets in the LDCs while at the same time
stressing that this liberalization should not go all the way towards
complete freedom. This leaves a whole gray area between the two
extremes and a lot of controversy about the question of how far
liberalization should go. Those economists stressing the importance
of political failures in allocating savings towards investment projects,
will be inclined to argue for a substantial movement towards liberali-
zation. Others who put more emphasis on the market failures will
argue that "one should not go too far" in this process ofliberalization
of the financial markets.
Today, as the LDCs have moved very far towards controlling the
savings-investment process in their countries, the voices ofthose who
stress the political failures are heard very loudly. If the LDCs take
drastic steps towards liberalizing their financial markets, it can be
expected that the themes stressed by the school of market failures
will again become fashionable.
It is therefore important to analyze these themes, so as to be able
to answer the question ofhow far deregulation in the financial markets
can go. This will be done in the following sections. We will, first,
discuss problems relating tofinancial marketstability and tomonetary
control in a deregulatedfinancial environment. Secondwe will analyze
the issue ofthe optimal timingofliberalizationofthefinancial markets
in the LDCs. This problems has become an acute one since the late
seventieswhen anumberofLatinAmericancountriesstarteda process
of liberalization, which ultimately failed.
Il. DEREGULATION AND FINANClAL STABILITY
In this section we analyze the question of how far one can go towards
a liberalization of the financial markets and the banking sector, with-
out endangering the stability of the financial system.
382A. Liberalization and financial stability
The strongest arguments against financial liberalization have been
made on the grounds that it would endanger the stability ofthe finan-
cial system. It is likely that these arguments will continue to weigh
heavily in the discussion. Let us analyze the analytical basis of these
arguments so as to see whether they are relevant for the LDCs.
There is now a widespread agreement that a complete deregulation
ofthe financial markets and in particular ofthe banking sector, would
be inimical to the stability of the system. In other words, it is now
generally accepted that financial markets (and the banking sector)
are fragile. Why? One can distinguish a number of reasons for this
fragility. They all have to do with some form of market failure.
The first and best known source of fragility of the banking sector
has to do with theoccurrenceofliquiditycrises. In a fractional banking
system, banks guarantee the convertibility of their deposits in cash.
In a competitiveenvironment, somebankswill inevitablygo bankrupt.
Deposit holders of these banks will find it impossible to collect their
claims. Thissolvencyproblemmaydegenerateinto aliquidityproblem
in other banks. The reason is twofold. First, customers ofbanks face
a problem in that they find it difficult to know with certainty whether
a bank is solvent or not. As a result, unfavorable news may quickly
change their evaluation of the soundness of the bank. Second, the
claims of the deposit holders, are organized on an "first come first
serve" basis. Thus, when the solvency ofthe bank is in doubt, deposit
holders have a strong incentive to run to their banks in order to
increase the probability of realizing their claim. This phenomenon
can easily degenerate into a large scale liquidity crisis. Banks will be
unable to satisfy the claims of all their customers because of the
illiquidity of the largest part of their assets1. In an unregulated envi-
ronment such a liquidity crisis can lead to a collapse of the banking
system. The history testifies that this is indeed a serious problem of
a competitive banking system.
Few people will argue that governments have no responsibility in
avoiding such liquidity crises. In fact in most if not all countries go-
vernments consideritto be theirresponsibility to stabilize the banking
system. The major unresolved issue is what form, and howfar govern-
ment regulation should go to solve this problem.
It is now generally accepted that as a minimum the government
(central bank) should be the lender of last resort. This means that
383when a liquidity crisis arises, it should be willing to lend cash to banks
in unlimited amounts. In many countries this lender of last resort
function has been supplemented by a deposit insurance scheme
guaranteed by the government. Theknowledge thatmonetary author-
ities are committed to step in when a liquidity crisis arises has proven
to be extraordinarily effective in avoiding the occurrence of these
crises in most countries.
Whereas the principle of the lender of last resort function
(supplemented or not by the deposit insurance scheme) is simple
enough, the regulatory implications of such a government guarantee
to the banking sector are far from obvious. There are good reasons
for this. First, the fact that the government extends a guarantee to
the banking system leads to a moral hazard problem. Banks will qe
tempted to finance more risky projects, when they know that the
government will bail them out in a time of crisis. This problem is
especiaUy important with deposit insurance schemes. It should not
arise with the lender of last resort function, which is only geared
towards solving liquidity problems ofsound banks and not bailing out
insolvent banks. In practice, however, it turns out to be very difficult
to distinguish between liquidity and solvency problems. As aresuit,
the lender of last resort function is now commonly interpreted as
including a responsibility ofbailing out the large banks, whether their
problems are due to insolvency or illiquidity2. The latest example is
the rescue effort ofthe Continental Il1inois by the US monetary auth-
orities, which clearly started as a solvency problem, butescalatedinto
a liquidity problem.
Thus, both the lender of last resort function of the central bank
and the deposit insurance schemes lead to similar problems of moral
hazard. As a result, these government guarantees will caU for a
monitoring of the activities of the banks. It is precisely here that the
cöntroversy arises about how much bank regulation is needed.
Bagehot, who laid the theoretical foundation of the lender of last
resort function of the central bank, argued that it would suffice to
impose a penalty interest rate when banks turned to the central bank
in times ofcrisis. Itis now generaUy feIt thatthisis insufficient, because
the use'of a penalty rate may not be a credible deterrent for banks.
This lack of credibility in turn has to do with the fact that in time of
crisis the use ofa penalty rate at which commercial banks can borrow
from the central bank increases the solvency probIems of the banks.
384The central bank may then decide that the penalty rate will not be
applied3.
From the preceding, one can conclude that the lender oflast resort
guarantee provided by central banks can only work satisfactorily if it
is accompanied by a monitoring of the banks' activities (prudential
control). The recent experiences ofthe liberalization process in Chile
give dramatic evidence to support this point. In 1979 the Chilean
bankswere liberatedfrom mostprudentialregulations, althoughthere
was an implicit understanding that the Chilean central bank would
continue to extend its lender of last resort guarantee. It is now felt
that the combination of complete deregulation and government
guarantees led to animportantmoral hazardproblem: it induced com-
mercialbanksin thatcountrytotakeonexcessiverisk, andcontributed
to the subsequent large scale banking failures (see McKinnon (1986)
and Tybout (1985) on this point).
One can summarize the preceding analysis as follows. Liquidity
crises which areinherentinacompetitivebankingsystemcanbesolved
by entrusting on the government the task of extending its guarantee
(lender oflast resort, deposit insurance schemes) to banks and deposit
holders. These guarantees, however, lead to new problems (moral
hazard) and require prudential contro!. How far should one go in
subjecting banks to these controls? Some countries have gone very
far in regulating their banking system. In fact, a great part of the
banking systems of the developing countries are under the complete
controlofthegovernmentauthorities. Theexperienceoftheindustrial
countries suggests thatone does notneednationalized bankingsectors
to solve the problem generated by liquidity crises.
B. The political economy offinancial regulations
It is now becoming clear that excessive government control overthe
bankingsectormayleadto new problemsoffinancialinstability. These
arise because theincentivesfor governmentstouse thebankingsystem
to finance spending, increases with the degree of government control
exerted over the banks. Itis more likely that in an environment where
most decisions in the banking sector are made or dictated by govern-
ment authorities, the latter will be tempted to turn to the same banks
to finance budget deficits. This may then lead to more inflation and
occasionally to inflationary processes that run out of contro!.
One additional factor which may help to understand why overregu-
385lation may lead to new forms of financial instability has to do with
external convertibility. Overregulation of banks will almost naturally
be accompanied by exchange controls (see Black (1984)) for an
analysis ofthe link between domestic control and exchange controls).
A failure to control capital movements will undermine the effective-
ness ofthecontrolsonbankingactivities. Asa result,heavilyregulated
banking systems are also systems where exchange controls will be
substantial. The existence ofexchange controls then provides an addi-
tional incentive for countries to abuse money for budgetary purposes.
This willlead on average to higher inflation.
Put differently, free capital mobility provides a check onthe domes-
tic authorities in theirtemptationtouse moneyfor financingbudgetary
deficits. Monetaryfinancing will quickly lead to largescale conversion
ofthe domestic currency into foreign currencies, forcing the monetary
authorities to resort to more orthodox financing. Exchange controls,
however, eliminate this external discipline, and therefore williead to
more frequent abuse ofthe banking sector to finance budget deficits,
and to more inflation.
Table 1 gives some evidence concerning this effect. We represent
the average yearly inflation rates together with their standard devia-
tions, in two groups of countries. The first group consists of those
countries which allow free capital mobility. The second group restricts
capital mobility4. In general, countries which allow free capital mobil-
ity have a relatively liberal banking sector, whereas countries which
restrict capital movements also tend to impose more regulations on
their banking system.
The evidence of table 1 lends itself to the following interpretation.
Countries which have closed off theirdomestic financial marketsfrom
the rest of the world have on average experienced an inflation rate
which was twice as high as in thosecountrieswhich allowedfree capital
mobility. In addition, the yearly variability of these inflation rates
was substantially higher in the former group of countries than in the
latter. The small size of the standard errors also indicates that these
differences between the two groups ofcountries are statistically signi-
ficant. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the political economy
hypothesis formulated here. That is, the closing offofdomestic finan-
cial markets from outside influences, gives an incentive to domestic
authorities to follow more inflationary policies.
One can conclude that a liberalization ofthe overregulatedbanking
sectors of many LDCs may be a good instrument to achieve more
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Average inflation and inflation variability in regulated and unregulated countries
(1971-84)
Inflation VariabilityofInflation
Countrieswithfree capitalmobility 8.5 5.5
(0.9) (1.0)
Countrieswith capitaIcontrols 15.8 10.6
(1.9) (1.6)
Note: (1) Computed using the classification of IMF, Annual Report on Exchange
Restrictions. Inflationis the yearly percentagechangein the CPI; As ameasure,
of yearly variability the standard deviation was selected. The sample contains
82 countries. The first group contains these countries which had free capital
mobility during the whole 1971-84period; the second group contains countries
with capital controls during the whole 1971-84 period. There are about ten
countries which changed the regulatory environment during the period. These
countries are not in the sample.
(2) Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated sample
means.
stabIe financial systems. TherecentliberalizationattemptsinSouthern
Cone countries, however, also makes clear that such liberalization
attempts can lead to problems. The case ofChile was already referred
t~. Anotherproblemhas to do with the timing ofthe financialliberali-
zation. This problem will be discussed in section V.
lIl. FINANClAL DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CON-
TROL
The question we try to answer in this section is the following: does
liberalization of the financial markets reduce the scope for domestic
monetary control? If the answer is positive we have an argument for
limiting the process of financialliberalization in LDCs. It should be
stressed that in this section, we study issues relating to government
control ofmacroeconomievariables, notissues relating togovernment
control of the allocation of credit, which is outside the scope of the
present article5.
Inthe previoussectionitwas pointedoutthatregulation ofdomestic
financial markets and controls on capital movements (exchange con-
trols) usually come together. Putdifferently, domestic controls cannot
work effectively if they are not accompanied by controls on capital
387movements. This point is made clear in figure 1. We represent the
loan market by a demand and supply schedule. The demand for loans
L d is a negative function of the domestic interest rate (r). The supply
of loans by banks is a positive function ofthe domestic interest rate6.
The equilibrium loan rate is rE.
Suppose, the authorities introduce a ceiling on the interest rate
equal to rMAX. As a result, there is excess demand for loans, so that
the domestic loan market will have to be rationed. If capital is free
to move between the domestic and the foreign countries, the excess
demand will spill over to the rest of the world. Domestic economie
agents who have been rationed out will obtain loans from foreign
banks. As aresult, the whole system of interest and credit controls
will be undermined. It also follows that the logic of credit controls
leads inevitably to controls on capital movements7.
FIGURE 1




The question we now want to address is the extent to which such
acontrolled system is better abIe to stabilize the domestic economy.
We will analyze this question in the tradition of PooIe (1970). That
388is, we ask the question ofhow stochastic disturbances affect domestic
macroeconomic variables (in particulardomestic output)under differ-
ent policy regimes. We will consider different disturbances, the first
one being a disturbance in the foreign interest rate. We assume fixed
exchange rates and no expectation of exchange rate changes.
Figure 2 shows the domestic loan market. We now recognize that
the demand and the supply of loans is also a function of the foreign
interest rate8. That is, when the foreign interest rate increases, the
supply ofdomestic loans bybanks is reduced, as banks seek to extend
loans to foreign residents. Similarly, when the foreign interest rate
increases residents will reduce their demand for loans supplied by
foreign banks. Thus, an increase in the foreign interest rate shifts the
loan supply schedule L s to the left, and the loan demand schedule L d
to the right. This is shown in figure 2 by the new loan supply and










389Letus now considertheeffects ofthis increase in theforeign interest
rate when the domestic creditmarketis left free. The new equilibrium
point will be in point F. The domestic interest rate increases. This
increase in the interest rate will exerta deflationary effect on domestic
output.
In a controlled system the effects of the foreign disturbance will be
quite different, and will depend on the degree of tightness of the
capital controls. If capital movements can be eliminated completely,
the demand and supply of loan schedules do not shift following the
foreign interest rate increase. As aresult, the domestic loan market
is completelyinsulated from the foreign shock. Thecontrolledinterest
rate rMAX and the excess demand is unaffected.
It is likely, however, that a completely effective control on capital
movements is difficult to achieve. In a system where capital controls
are not completely tight the foreign interest rate increase willlead to
an upward shift of the loan supply and demand schedules, as shown
in figure 2 by the lines Ls" and L[. As aresuit, the excess demand
for loans increases from AB to A'B'. At the unchanged domestic
interest rate rMAX, the supply of domestic credit declines. The system
of credit rationing will have to be tightened.
Thus, when one compares the two systems, one can see that the
liberal credit marketwill fully reflect theforeign interest rateincrease.
The regulated system is able to insulate the domestic credit market,
to the extent that the capital control system can be made to work
effectively. Ifthis control is incomplete, however, the foreign interest
rateincreasewill bereflectedina reductionoftheavailabilityofcredit.
Both the domestic interest rate increase and the reduction of the
availability of credit will negatively affect domestic economic activity.
Which ofthe two effects will bemore deflationaryis difficult to predict
a priori. Itdepends on the way the outputmarket reacts to an increase
in the interest rate and to a reduction in the availability ofcredit. We
conclude that ifthe capital controls are completely tight, the domestic
monetary authorities can insulate the domestic economy from the
deflationary effects ofanincrease in theforeign interestrate. Ifcapital
movements cannot be fully controlled, such an interest rate increase
will have a deflationaryeffectonthedomesticeconomyvia a reduction
of the availability of credit.
In the previous paragraphs we analyzed how foreign shocks affect
the domestic economy. It is also important to analyze the effects of
domestic disturbances. Are the monetary authorities better able to
390stabilize the economy when the financial markets are regulated than
when they are left free? We concentrate here also on banking regula-
tions, and in particular on the regulation of the loan rate.
Many different domestic shocks can be analyzed. We concentrate
on just a few. Suppose, first, that there are stochastic disturbances in
the demand for bankdeposits. Such disturbances translate themselves
into disturbances in the supplyof bank loans9. This is represented in
figure 3 by the lines Li and L? between which the supply of bank
loans fluctuates. In a liberal banking system these disturbances lead
to fluctuations in the loan rate (represented by the range Tl and ru
between which the loan rate will fluctuate). In a regulated bank loan
market, these disturbances lead to fluctuations of the availability of
credit (represented by the range between Ll and Lu infigure 3). Again
it is unclear, a priori, in which system the domestic good market will





















391Shocks can also occur in the demand for loans. (See figure 2, where
we consider only the shifts in the Ld-curve). These disturbances lead,
in an unregulated system, to movements in the interest rate. These
interest rate movements have the effect of accommodating the supply
of loans. Thus, when the demand for loans increases, the interest rate
increase leads to an increase in the supply of loans. In a regulated
system, this accommodation is absent, so that the increased demand
for loans only increases the excess demand in the loan market. As a
result, the rationing system will be put under increasing pressure,
leading to increased evasion ofthe regulation. Thus, only ifthe autho-
rities have a tight control over the loan rate can they avoid that the
movements in the demand for loans affects the total supply (availabil-
ity) of credit.
We arrive at the following conclusion. Shocks in the foreign interest
rate and in the demand for loans put the regulatory regime under
pressure. Only if the regulations can be enforced very tightly, will
these shocks have no further effects on the availability of credit, and
on the goods market. Movements of the supply of loans (due to dis-
turbancesin the demandfor deposits) leadto fluctuations in the availa-
bility of credit in a regulated environment. From this analysis one
can conclude that the task ofstabilizing the economy following finan-
cial disturbances is not necessarily made easier in an environment in
which bank credit is regulated. In general, the theory does not allow
us to conclude that the domestic authorities can stabilize the economy
better when the domestic banking sector is subjected to interest rate
regulations. In fact this proposition can be generalized to most bank
regulations. That is, there is no theoretical presumption that regula-
tions on bankingactivities make it possible for the authorities to better
stabilize the economylO.
IV. MONETARY CONTROL AND FINANClAL REGULA-
TIONS: SOME EMPIRICAL TESTS
In this section we give some empirical evidence for the proposition
derived in the previous section. We ask the questionwhethercountries
which have regulated their financial markets have been better able
to stabilize their economies. The way we go about testing this prop-
osition is very much like in the previous section. We classify countries
according to the degree to which they have insulated their financial
392markets from foreign markets. We then compute the average and the
standard deviations of the growth rates of GDP during 1971-84. The
results are presented in table 2.
TABLE 2
AveragegrowthofGDPanditsyearly variability in regulatedandunregulatedcountries
(1971-84)
GrowthofGDP VariabilityofGDPgrowth




Note: (1) Computed using the classification of IMF, Annual Report on Exchange
Restrictions. Inflation is the yeady percentagechange in theCPI; As ameasure
of yeady variability the standard deviation was selected. The sample contains
82 countries. The first group contains these countries which had free capital
mobility during the whole 1971-84period; the second group contains countries
with capital controls during the whole 1971-84 period. There are about ten
countries which changed the regulatory environment during the period. These
countries are not in the sample.
(2) Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated sample
means.
The countries with free capital mobility experienced a somewhat
higher growth rate of output and a higher standard deviation than
the countries withcapital controls. Fromthesize ofthe standarderrors
of these estimates, however, one can see that these differences
between the two groups of countries are too small to be significant.
Thus, one can conclude that the evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that countries with capital controls have not been better
able to stabilize output than countries with free capital mobility.
The evidence provided here, ofcourse, is notconclusive. Onecould
always argue that, for some unknown reason, the group of countries
with capital controls would have experienced a higher outputvariabil-
ity without the controls.
V. THE TIMING OF FINANClAL LIBERALIZATION
Prior to the liberalization attempts ofSouthern Cone countries during
the second halfofthe seventies, economists attached little importance
393to the issue of the timing of these attempts. With the benefit of
hindsight we now know that an incorrect timing of the liberalization
process often leads to its failure. Recently, therefore, important
research has been done which aims at deriving general conclusions
about the optimal timing of the liberalization. Here we will discuss
two issues which have loomed large in the liberalization process of
the Southern Conecountries. First, thereis the issue whetherfinancial
liberalization should wait until macroeconomic stability is achieved,
or whether, on the contrary, financial liberalization can be used as
an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization. The second issue has
to do with the question whether the capital account should be
liberalized before or after the liberalization of the current account.
A. Financiailiberalization and macroeconomie stability
The evidence presented in the previous two sections suggests that
countries that have had relatively free capital mobility during a long
period of time (1971-84) also have experienced more macroeconomic
stability (i.e. a low and less variabie inflation with comparable growth
performance) thanthosecountrieswhich haveclosedofttheirfinancial
markets from the rest of the world. Does this mean that financial
liberalization can be used as an instrument to bring about more stabil-
ity in the macroeconomic environment? The governments of the
Southern Cone countries which started the liberalization process dur-
ing the seventies have considered financialliberalization as oneofthe
instrurnents in a program aimed at reducing the macroeconomic insta-
bility in their countries (see Edwards and Edwards (1987)). We can
now say that this has not worked, and that finanCial liberalization
failed in these countries because it was introduced in a situation of
extreme macroeconomic instability. What is more, we know from the
experience ofthesecountriesthatwhenfinancialliberalizationis intro-
duced in an environment of extreme macroeconomic instability, it is
likely to increase this instability.
Table 3 gives some data on inflation and monetary policies prior
and after the liberalization policies in Chile and Argentina. It can be
seen that in the period preceding the liberalization attempts (1976-78)
inflation and the growth rates of the money stock were extremely
high in these two countries. Thus the liberalization attempts which
started around 1979 in both countries were done in an environment
of uncommon macroeconomic instability. During the liberalization
394phases, inflation and the growth rates of the money stock tended to
decline. When these liberalization programs were discarded these two
variables started to increase again.
TABLE 3
Inflation and Growth ofMoney Stock in Argentina and Chile






















Souree: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Note: Inflationrelatesto theconsumerprice; moneyis definedas MI (line 34in IFS).
It is important to analyze the reasons why financial liberalization
has failed when it was introduced in an unstable macroeconomic envi-
ronmentll. At a very generalIevel one can formulate the following
hypothesis. High inflation generally leads to large differences in sec-
toral inflation rates (see Fischer (1982) where it is shown that the
shocks in relative prices increase with the level of inflation). Such a
differential development ofprices in different sectors also implies that
the rates of return on investment projects will tend to diverge signifi-
395candy. In a liberal financial system these large differences in rates of
return will be a natural breeding ground for speculative activities.
The reason is that economie agents are able to freely borrow at an
interestrate which is equaltotheforeign interestrateplus theexpected
rate ofdepreciation (appreciation) ofthedomesticcurrency. Incertain
sectors of the economy, however, the expected rates of return will
be substantially higher than this borrowing cost. As aresult, the wil-
lingness to take on debt will be high. This effect, and the willingness
to become a large debtor, increases when the varianee of the rates
of return across projects increases. Since the varianee goes up with
the rate of inflation, one can conclude that in a liberalized financial
markettheincentivestotakeondebt (includingforeign debt) increases
with the rate of inflation12.
This phenomenon of speculative frenzy took place in countries like
Chile and Argentina during the late seventies. In Chile in particular,
a very large differential price development occurred between the non-
traded and the traded goods sector. This followed from the attempts
to reduce the high rate of inflation by pegging the exchange rate to
the dollar. The effect of this policy was to slow down the rate of
inflation in the traded goods sector. In the non-traded goods sector,
however, it turned out to be very difficult to reduce the high rate of
price increases13• As aresult, the profitability of projects in the non-
traded goods sector (especially in the construction industry) was
unusually high. In order to profit from these extreme profit oppor-
tunities economie agents were led to increase their (foreign) indebted-
ness in substantial amounts.
This speculative frenzy was exacerbated in the Chilean case by the
fact that, after having abolished all controls on banking (including
prudential controls), the monetary authorities continued to provide
lenderoflast resort and deposit insurancefacilities. As argued earlier,
this led to a moral hazard problem, and reinforced the tendency of
banks for excessive risk taking.
The upshot of all this is that high and variable inflation leads to
excessive debt accumulation. The financial system then becomes vul-
nerable to a sudden turn-around in relative prices. When this happens
(e.g. when as in the Chilean case the relative price of non-tradables
declines following a devaluation ofthe peso) many projects suddenly
become unprofitable. As a result, economie agents with high debt
exposure are driven into bankruptcy. A debt deflation process (as
described by Fisher in 193314) can be set in motion, during which a
396large number of economic agents are driven into bankruptcy, leading
to a depression of economic activity. In most cases these large distur-
bances lead to strong forces pushing towards a re-regulation of the
financial markets. In some ofthe Southern Cone countries thegovern-
ment renationalized a large part of the banking sector.
In conclusion one can say that in order for financial liberalization
to be introduced successfully one needs a stabie domestic mac-
roeconomic environment. In addition, as was pointed out in earlier
sections, it should take into account the needfor continuingprudential
supervision of banking activities. Both ideas were disregarded in the
Southern Cone countries. The positive experience of Korea, with its
limited financialliberalization, suggests that when these two ideas are
taken into account financial liberalization can be successful (see
McKinnon (1986)).
All this leaves us with an uneasy paradox. It appears from the evi-
dence that in the long run macroeconomic stability (low inflation) is
more likely to be observed in countries which keep their financial
markets opento the rest oftheworld. Ontheotherhand, the evidence
also suggests that in order for a country to successfully move from a
closed towards an openfinancial system apre-existingmacroeconomic
stability is required. Put differently, a liberal financial system and free
capital movements help countries in maintaining a stable mac-
roeconomic environment. They do not, however, help countries who
want to move from a high level of macroeconomic volatility to more
stabie conditions. These countries should first stabilize their
economies before introducing programs of financial liberalization.
B. Liberalization ofthe capital and the current accounts
One of the issues which has arisen in the context of financialliberali-
zationis thequestionwhetherthecurrentaccountshouldbeliberalized
priorto thecapital account. Thisissue has proppedupin everycountry
engaged in these liberalization attempts. Chile opened the current
account first, while Argentina and Uruguay decided to liberalize the
capital account first15. Countries like Korea have had to face up to
the same problem.
Following the first analysis of the problem by McKinnon (1973), a
consensus has nowemërgedsuggestingthat the currentaccount should
be liberalized before the capital account16. Without going into the fuH
detail of the arguments one can summarize these as follows. Liberali-
397zationoftrade(e.g. a reductionofimporttariffs) leadstoareaIlocation
of factors of production away from the import substituting industries
towards the export sector. As a result both imports and exports will
increase. The timing ofthis process, however, is such that the import
surge is likely to precede the boost in exports. The reason is that the
import substituting industries are likely to disappear before the new
export potential is put into place. Thus, the trade liberalization is
likely to produce a temporary trade deficit. In the absence of capital
movements this williead to a depreciation of the currency17. Such a
depreciation is also desirable because it gives an additional stimulus
to the export industries while protecting temporarily the import com-
peting industries. In other words, the depreciation of the currency
aIlows for a smoother adjustment process.
H, however, capital is liberalized simultaneously with the trade
liberalization, this depreciation of the currency is less likely to occur.
The argument is as foIlows. In LDCs the rate ofreturn on investment
projects is usuaIly higher than in the industrialized world. Therefore,
the liberalization of capital movements will lead to a capital inflow,
which by itselftends to appreciate the currency. Infact, we can expect
that this appreciation occurs very quickly because financial markets
react faster than goods markets. Thus, a simultaneous opening ofthe
current and capital account leads most probably to a quick apprecia-
tion of the currency. The depreciation wiIl occur only later because
of the slow adjustments in the goods markets. It foIlows that the
liberalization ofthe capital accountwill makethedomesticadjustment
to free trademorecostly. Theappreciatedcurrencywill hurttheexport
sector while speeding up the elimination of the import substituting
industries. As a result, this trade liberalization process is likely to
produce a higher rate of temporary unemployment than if it is intro-
duced without the liberalization of the capital account.
The general conclusion one can derive from this analysis is that
LDCs who want to liberalize trade are weIl advised to wait with the
liberalization of the capital account until the domestic adjustment to
freer trade is weIl under way. A simultaneous liberalization of the
trade and capital accounts is likely to jeopardize the whole liberaliza-
tion attempt, because it exacerbates the adjustment costs ofthe trade
liberalization process.
It should be stressed here that the preceding analysis is tailored to
the situation of the LDCs, so that the conclusion about the optimal
order of the liberalization may not hold for other countries with dif-
398ferent economic structure. More precisely, the conclusion that the
liberalization ofcapitalflows willieadtoan appreciationofthedomes-
tic currency does not hold generally. Countries with a low domestic
rate of return (mostly developed ones) will more likely experience a
depreciation oftheir currency when capital is allowed to move freely.
Thus, in these countries the optimalorder of the liberalization of the
current and the capital account may have to be reversed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have surveyed different macroeconomic issues con-
cerning the liberalization offinancial markets in the LDCs. We found
that countries which have allowed openfinancial markets have experi-
enced significantly lower and less variabie rates of inflation during
1971-84. This gain was not offset by unfavorable growth rates of out-
put. Our interpretation is that the openness of financial markets to
the rest of the world acts as a disciplining device on the behavior of
the domestic financial authorities.
Although there are clear gains in the long run of financial deregu-
lation, there are also important problems relating to the timing ofthe
liberalization process. These problems have received a lotofattention
in the recent literature, as a result of the spectacular failures in some
Southern Cone countries.
We are left with a paradoxical situation. Open financial markets
help countries to maintain a low and relatively stabie inflation rate.
However, once a country experiences high inflation rates in a control-
led environment, financial deregulation does not seem to be an
appropriate strategy to disinflate the economy. In this paper we
attempted to interpret this paradox.
NOTES
1. In a sense it can be said that this is a form of market failure. In perfect capital
markets, it should be possible to quickly sell assets for cash, so that banks can
satisfy their customers. See Baltensperger and Dermine (1987) on this issue.
2. This interpretation in disputed. See Humphrey and Keheler (1984), where it is
argued that the lender of last resort function is a responsibility of the central
bank to avoid a collapse of the money stock during a liquidity crisis. This can
be done even if one allows a large number of banks to go bankrupt. It should
be said that this is a minority view among economists.
3993. This is the same as saying that the accouncement ofunlimited borrowing facilities
at a penalty rate is time inconsistent. During a crisis, it is not optimal for the
central bank to stick to the announced high interest rate. The knowledge that
the central bank wililikely change the rule is sufficient to induce banks to take
more risky loans in their portfolio.
4. This classification of countries is based on the International Monetary Fund,
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions.
5. Another macroeconomic issue which is not discussed here is whether the price
level is determinatein the absenceofbankingregulations (such as reserve require-
ments and interest ceilings). The consensus now is that no problems of price
indeterminacy arise in a deregulated bankingsystem. See Fama (1980) and (1983)
and McCalium (1985).
6. We make abstraction here of the problem mentioned earlier when the interest
rate increases so much that banks reduce the supply of loans.
7. Note that the problem is the same as price controls. For example, the institution
of minimum prices inevitably leads to import controls. A good example of this
is the EEC agricultural policies.
8. Strictly speaking we should make a distinction between the foreign deposit and
loan rate. We make abstraction ofthis complication here. See De Grauwe (1982)
for such an analysis.
9. This follows from the balance sheet constraint of the banks.
10. For a similar conclusion see Baltensperger and Dermine (1987).
11. See McKinnon (1986a) and 1986b), Corbo (1985), Tybout (1985) and Corbo,
de Melo and Tybout (1986) on these issues.
12. Very interesting discussions of the speculative frenzies in hyperinflationary
periods can be found in Bresciani-Turroni (1937). See also Minsky (1986) who
for years has beenarguingthatthis kind ofspeculative activity makes thefinancial
markets of capitalist systems very fragiIe.
13. See Edwards and Edwards (1987) for analysis of this period. It is made clear
there that one of the reasons was the maintenance of wage indexing, which led
to a lot of inertia in the wage increases.
14. See Fisher (1933).
15. The Argentinian experience is discussed by McKinnon (1982) and Fernandez
(1985); the Uruguayan experience by Hanson and de Melo (1985).
16. See Frenkel (1983), Khan and Zahler (1985), Krueger (1983), Edwards (1984)
and (1986) and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986).
17. Manycomplications can be introduced intothe reasoningleadingto a Iess clearcut
conclusion about the effects of trade liberalization and the real exchange rate.
Forafurther analysis seeJohnson (1969), Corden (1971) and Edwards (1987).
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